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1. Introduction
A well-established fact in economics is that income differences across
countries are accounted for largely by differences in aggregate productivity.2
However, improving the aggregate productivity of poorer countries requires
identifying specific policies that are responsible for these differences in pro-
ductivity. In this paper, I propose that one particular policy, the efficiency
of bankruptcy procedures, is an important source of differences in aggregate
productivity.3
The starting point of this paper is to note that aggregate productivity is
a weighted average of firm-level productivities. Therefore, aggregate produc-
tivity can be decomposed into levels and weights. For example, aggregate
labor productivity can be decomposed into each firm’s labor productivity and
employment share. Using a harmonized dataset constructed from national
statistical agencies’ data for a sample of OECD countries, I first document
that firm size (number of employees) and firm-level labor productivity are
positively correlated in each country — that is, larger firms tend to be more
productive than smaller firms. I then document that countries with higher
aggregate labor productivity tend to have i) a greater share of their work-
force employed in large firms and ii) a greater proportion of large firms in
the economy.
Differences in employment shares are an important component of the
differences in aggregate labor productivity across countries. An Olley-Pakes
decomposition suggests that up to 36 percent of the difference in aggregate
labor productivity among OECD countries can be attributed to differences
in employment shares. In order to place this magnitude into perspective, the
decomposition exercise suggests that Spain and Italy would be as productive
as Germany if they had Germany’s employment shares.
I develop a model of bankruptcy and show that the efficiency of bankruptcy
procedures, measured as the percentage of a loan a lender can recover from
2See Hsieh and Klenow (2010) and references therein.
3One reason that the link between bankruptcy procedures and aggregate productivity
may have been relatively unexplored is the lack, until recently, of comparable cross-country
data on bankruptcy.
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a bankrupt borrower, affects the weights of the firm-size distribution. Thus,
differences in bankruptcy efficiency generate differences in the employment
share of large firms, the proportion of large firms, and aggregate produc-
tivity consistent with the data. The insight that arises from the model is
that countries with less efficient bankruptcy procedures tend to have lower
aggregate productivity because their bankruptcy procedures induce lenders
to allocate funds to smaller (less productive) firms in order to separate pro-
ductive from less-productive projects. There is empirical support for this
mechanism: data from the European Central Bank shows that, across coun-
tries, efficient bankruptcy procedures are associated with a higher proportion
of new bank loans allocated to large firms.
Why focus on bankruptcy procedures instead of other potential sources
of aggregate productivity differences? First, there is direct evidence that
bankruptcy reform leads to changes in the size distribution of firms (Ponticelli
and Alencar (2016), discussed in Section 1.1). Second, World Bank measures
of bankruptcy efficiency are highly correlated with employment shares across
countries (see Section 2.3). Third, evidence suggests that access to finance
is an important determinant of firm size.4 It has also been documented that
banks adjust their lending practices in response to bankruptcy procedures
(Davydenko and Franks, 2008) and that bankruptcy reforms affect credit
markets.5 These reasons point towards bankruptcy as a promising candidate
for explaining variation in employment shares through firm access to finance.
Description of the Model. I consider a static Lucas (1978) span of control
environment, augmented along the lines of Erosa and Hidalgo-Cabrillana
(2008) to introduce financial intermediation. The model features a com-
petitive lender and a continuum of households. If households fail to secure
funding to start a firm (become entrepreneurs), they rent their labor for a
wage (become workers). Households are endowed with either high or low
entrepreneurial productivity but have identical abilities as workers. The
lender wants to allocate resources to high-productivity entrepreneurs, but
4For example, Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Cabral and Mata (2003) argue that
financing constraints, particularly those of startups, are important in shaping the firm-
size distribution.
5See Araujo et al. (2012) for evidence from Brazil, Gamboa-Cavazos and Schneider
(2007) for Mexico, Rodano et al. (2015) for Italy, and Lambert-Mogiliansky et al. (2007)
for Russia.
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is constrained by two frictions. First, entrepreneurial productivity is private
information of the entrepreneurs. However, productivity can be inferred by
lenders after production has taken place. Hence, the lender could achieve
first-best allocations if it could impose unlimited penalties on entrepreneurs
who misrepresent their productivity-type. The second friction limits the
penalty the lender can impose for false productivity reports. An exogenous
limit on the penalty for false reports can be mapped to the level of bankruptcy
efficiency in equilibrium, as this limit dictates the percentage of the loan that
the lender can recover from borrowers who misrepresent their productivity
and do not have enough resources to pay back the full amount of the loan.
In equilibrium, as the level of bankruptcy efficiency decreases, two forces
decrease aggregate productivity. First, the average firm productivity de-
creases. This effect is due to the tightening of the incentive compatibility
constraint of low-productivity households; as low-productivity households
face a weaker punishment for misrepresenting their productivity, the lender
deters them from lying by increasing their probability of obtaining a loan
relative to high-productivity households. In the aggregate, then, there is a
higher proportion of low-productivity firms than before. Second, the number
of high-productivity firms decreases. This effect comes from the lender’s fea-
sibility constraint, as funding for low-productivity firms reduces the available
funding remaining for high-productivity firms.
An important characteristic of the environment is that the optimal con-
tract does not distort the firm-size margin. Thus, conditional on obtain-
ing funding, firms secure enough capital and labor to operate at their op-
timal size. This has two implications. First, there is no capital misalloca-
tion among existing firms as there is no dispersion of marginal products.
Hence, bankruptcy affects aggregate productivity solely through firm se-
lection.6 Second, for a given recovery rate, there is a one-to-one mapping
between firm productivity and firm size. By construction, firm-level Total
Factor Productivity (TFP) levels are exogenous and therefore invariant with
bankruptcy efficiency. Aggregate TFP then varies with bankruptcy efficiency
solely through the weights of the firm-size distribution.
The paper then proceeds to endogenize wages. Endogenous wages amplify
the differences in TFP. Lower bankruptcy efficiency decreases aggregate pro-
6Put differently, there is capital misallocation on the extensive margin, but not on the
intensive margin.
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ductivity, which lowers total output, which in turn depresses wages. Lower
wages decrease the value of the outside option for entrepreneurs, reinforcing
private information frictions by increasing the incentives of low-productivity
households to misreport their type. Lenders respond by allocating even more
funding to low-productivity firms at the expense of high-productivity firms,
and worse selection decreases aggregate productivity further.
The model is calibrated to the establishment-size distribution and bankruptcy
efficiency of the United States. The quantitative experiment asks how much
the United States’ TFP would change if its bankruptcy processes were as ef-
ficient as those of other countries. Given OECD bankruptcy efficiency rates,
the model generates a drop in aggregate TFP of up to 30 percent and a
drop in aggregate labor productivity of up to 45 percent. This is close to
the aggregate labor productivity differences between the United States and
Greece, the country in the sample with the lowest recovery rate and lowest
aggregate productivity measure.
Intuitively, large TFP effects that result from imperfect selection are con-
sistent with Hopenhayn’s (2014) rank reversal. Hopenhayn (2014) shows an-
alytically that the distortions that have the greatest potential to generate
large TFP effects are those that flip the size-ranking of firms from an undis-
torted economy to the distorted economy. Imperfect selection is an extreme
form of rank reversal: Some of the large firms in an undistorted economy
become zero-size firms in the distorted economy.
1.1. Relationship to the existing literature
Spurred by Restuccia and Rogerson’s (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow’s
(2009) seminal work, the literature has identified that a potentially impor-
tant source of differences in aggregate productivity are distortions that cause
inputs to be inefficiently allocated across heterogeneous production units.
This paper contributes to a literature that seeks to tie such distortions to
directly measurable policies.7 A related literature focuses on financial fric-
tions as a source of capital misallocation across existing firms.8 Particularly
7Examples include firing costs (Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993), unemployment insur-
ance and employment protection (Lagos, 2006), size-dependent policies (Guner, Ventura
and Yi, 2008), trade barriers (Eslava et al., 2013; Bond et al., 2013), and entry regulations
(Barseghyan and DiCecio, 2011; Moscoso-Boedo and Mukoyama, 2012).
8Recent examples are Amaral and Quintin (2010), Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011),
Caselli and Gennaioli (2013), Steinberg (2013), Greenwood, Sanchez and Wang (2013),
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related to this paper are some working papers that explicitly incorporate
bankruptcy as a determinant of financial frictions (Rodriguez-Delgado, 2010;
Corbae and D’Erasmo, 2014; Senkal, 2014; Tamayo, 2015). In contrast to
these financial frictions papers, this paper abstracts from misallocation of
capital among existing firms.9 Instead of focusing on dispersion of marginal
products, it highlights selection of firms as the mechanism by which financial
frictions affect aggregate productivity.
To deliver the model’s tractability, I build on theoretical work by Erosa
and Hidalgo-Cabrillana (2008). As in their framework, the model of financial
intermediation has analytical solutions, and contracting over weights of the
firm-size distribution improves welfare. An important difference between the
modelling framework of this paper and Erosa and Hidalgo-Cabrillana (2008)’s
is that firms in their economy have constant returns to scale technologies,
which paired with a fixed cost implies increasing returns. Hence, a deter-
minate firm size is obtained by imposing an exogenous maximum firm size.
This modelling assumption is innocuous in their framework because they are
pursuing facts unrelated to firm size. I dispense with the assumption of con-
stant returns and replace it with decreasing returns to scale technologies that
deliver a non-degenerate firm-size distribution. This difference is not minor:
with decreasing returns to scale, the solution to the optimal contract is such
that, conditional on funding, firm size is optimal, which is why there is no
dispersion in marginal products. As a result, the model delivers a closed-form
solution for aggregate TFP.
Direct evidence for the effects of bankruptcy procedures on firm-size dis-
tributions comes from Ponticelli and Alencar (2016), who study the impact
of a reform in Brazilian bankruptcy law that improved Brazil’s bankruptcy
efficiency. The identification strategy relies on differences in the application
Moll (2014), and Cole, Greenwood and Sanchez (2016).
9The theory of misallocation of capital among existing firms faces at least two chal-
lenges. First, recent literature has highlighted that dispersion of marginal products in the
data need not be evidence of distortions (Caunedo, 2015; Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and
Scarpetta, 2013). Second, the quantitative importance of this channel is undermined by
firms’ ability to save their way out of borrowing constraints (Banerjee and Moll, 2010;
Midrigan and Xu, 2014), their ability of firms to pledge earnings as well as assets (Li,
2015), and large measured dispersions’ not implying large distortions (Gilchrist, Sim and
Zakrajsek, 2013). Using data from South Korea, Colombia, and China, Midrigan and Xu
(2014) find that the bulk of TFP losses from financial frictions are due to selection rather
than to misallocation of capital among existing firms.
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of the reform across judicial districts due to differences in the congestion
of local courts. Crucially, Brazilian laws do not allow creditors or firms to
choose the district in which to file a bankruptcy case. Ponticelli and Alencar
(2016) find that bankruptcy reform led to an increase in secured loans to
manufacturing firms, as well as an increase in investment and average firm
size.
One contribution of the paper is to document the strong positive corre-
lation between aggregate productivity, the employment share of large firms,
and the proportion of large firms in the economy. Related work that doc-
uments differences in the size distribution of firms across countries has fo-
cused on the manufacturing sector. For example, Hsieh and Klenow (2014)
and Bento and Restuccia (forthcoming) document a positive relationship be-
tween average firm size and aggregate productivity. Bartelsman, Haltiwanger
and Scarpetta (2013) finds a large dispersion of labor productivity in a set of
countries. I find that these observations hold for broad as well as narrowly
defined sectors of the economy, which suggests a role for firm-level, rather
than sector-level, explanations. An exception to the focus on manufacturing
is contemporaneous work by Poschke (2015), who uses Global Entrepreneur-
ship Monitor (GEM) data (for small firms) and Amadeus data (for larger
firms) to document that, in a sample of roughly 30 countries, large firms
are more prevalent and account for a larger fraction of employment in richer
countries. A limitation of GEM, as compared to the OECD/Eurostat SDBS
used in this paper, is that it does not include information on value added,
and hence, labor productivity.
The current paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the motivating
facts. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 discusses how the model is
taken to the data. Section 5 discusses the calibration, Section 6 presents the
quantitative findings, and Section 7 concludes.
2. Motivating Facts
2.1. OECD Firm Data
The firm-level data in this paper comes from the OECD/Eurostat Struc-
tural and Demographic Business Statistics database. The data is broken
out by industry and by firm size class (number of employees). The OECD
makes a particular effort to harmonize industry, firm size class and variable
definitions across countries. An advantage of this database is that data are
compiled directly by national statistical agencies from business registers and
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enterprise surveys, so they are representative of the universe of registered
firms.10 A drawback of this database is that it is not possible to calculate
TFP at the firm level because of missing capital and investment data. Hence,
this empirical section focuses on labor productivity, interesting in itself, but
also used as a proxy for TFP.11
The firm-level data of the twelve countries included in the analysis covers
the period from 2004 to 2009.12 The results presented report findings for the
widest available private sector grouping: the Total Industry, Market Services
and Construction sector (ISIC Rev.3 10-74). This sector accounts for 70-80
percent of these economies’ value added.13
Table 1 reports two statistics that describe the relationship between firm
size and firm-level labor productivity.14 For virtually all countries in the
sample, the correlation between firm-size class and firm-labor productivity is
high and positive. A notable exception is Denmark, where small firms are,
on average, more productive than the largest firms. However, excluding the
smallest firms for Denmark yields a correlation of 0.97. Table 1 also reports
10See Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015) for a discussion of sampling issues with Amadeus
(ORBIS), the alternative commercial dataset.
11Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) find a correlation of about 0.6 for TFP and
labor productivity for firms in the United States.
12The database covers as many as thirty-three countries. No data is available for the
year 2008. Countries were excluded from the sample if they were missing data during the
2004-2009 time period, other than for 2008. The sample also excludes former communist
countries, countries with populations less than a million during the 2004-2009 time period,
and countries in which the oil-rent-to-GDP ratio exceeded 10 percent during 2004-2009.
The reason for this exclusion criteria is that the firm composition in these countries may
be distorted. The time period is chosen to match the earliest bankruptcy data available
and to exclude the disruption of the Great Recession. The underlying data are enterprise-
(or firm-) level data as opposed to establishment-level data.
13According to EU KLEMS data, this sector’s share of value added ranges from 71.7
percent in Denmark to 78 percent in Italy for the 2004-2009 period. The excluded sectors
are agriculture (ISIC Rev.3 01-05) and public services (ISIC Rev.3 75-99).
14Labor productivity at the firm level is measured as value added per employee (en-
gaged). Employee (engaged) counts self-employed enterprises as one employee. While this
measure is the relevant one for this analysis as the emphasis is on employment shares,
one can find measures of labor productivity that control for hours and quality as well
by using value added per unit of payroll instead. The idea is that payroll incorporates
hours worked, and to the extent that wages reflect worker quality, it also controls for labor
quality. Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2013, footnote 5) finds that measures of
firm-level labor productivity in the U.S. are robust to using payroll instead of employees.
8
the labor productivity ratio between the largest and smallest size class. The
dispersion in productivity is large: an employee in Portugal who works for a
firm with 250 or more employees produces almost three times as much value
added as an employee in Portugal who works for a firm with fewer than ten
employees. After Denmark, the country with the smallest ratio is the UK,
where workers are 20 percent more productive in the largest firms than they
are in the smallest firms.15
Table 1: Firm size and firm productivity (2004-2009)
Correlation between firm size class and Labor productivity ratio between
firm labor productivity largest and smallest size class
Austria 0.97 1.56
Belgium 0.92 1.73
Denmark -0.07 0.92
Finland 0.96 1.32
Germany 0.91 1.35
Greece 0.97 2.85
Italy 0.99 2.33
Netherlands 0.83 1.57
Portugal 0.99 2.92
Spain 0.99 1.99
Sweden 0.94 1.39
United Kingdom 0.85 1.24
Notes: Firm labor productivity is Value Added (at factor costs) divided by Total Em-
ployment (number engaged). Firm-size classes are 1) 1-9 employees, 2) 10-19 employees,
3) 20-49 employees, 4) 50-249 employees, and 5) 250 or more employees. Data refers to
the Total Industry, Market Services, and Construction sector (ISIC Rev.3 10-74). The
correlation is calculated each year and then averaged for the 2004-2009 period. Denmark’s
low correlation is related to the outstanding productivity of its firms in firm-size class 1.
When these are excluded, Denmark’s correlation is 0.97 and its labor productivity ratio
is 1.19.
Source: SDBS Structural Business Statistics.
Figure 1 shows aggregate labor productivity and the employment share
of firms with 250 or more employees. The strong positive correlation in this
15The positive correlation between firm size and firm-level productivity has been in-
dividually identified for various countries (e.g. Spain (Castany, Lpez-Bazo and Moreno,
2005), the U.S. (Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson, 2008, footnote 16), and Canada (Le-
ung, Meh and Terajima, 2008)). Hsieh and Olken (2014) document a positive correlation
between firm size and firm-level labor productivity in India, Indonesia, and Mexico.
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figure suggests that productive economies allocate a larger share of their
workforce to large firms, which also tend to be the most productive firms.
There is also a visible divide between Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain —
to which I refer to as South Europe — on one hand and the remaining
countries of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden, and
United Kingdom — to which I refer as North Europe — on the other. South
Europe economies allocate less than 25 percent of their workforces to large
firms whereas North Europe economies allocate more than 30 percent of their
workforces to large firms.
Figure 1: Employment Share of Large Firms and Labor Productivity (2004-2009)
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Notes: GDP per hour worked is in real 2005 USD. Employment data is total employees
(engaged) for the Total Industry, Market Services, and Construction sector (ISIC Rev.3
10-74). Both statistics are averaged for the 2004-2009 period. The correlation is 0.72.
Source: OECD Annual National Accounts and SDBS Structural Business Statistics.
Figure 2 shows aggregate labor productivity and the proportion of large
firms in the economy. Productive economies allocate a larger share of their
workforces to large firms and large firms make up a larger proportion of firms
in these economies. Therefore, it is not the case that a few large firms are
responsible for most of the hiring in productive countries; instead, large firms
10
are more numerous. Furthermore, Table A-1 in Appendix A shows that these
correlations also hold within more narrowly defined industries.
Figure 2: Proportion of Large Firms and Labor Productivity (2004-2009)
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Notes: GDP per hour worked is in real 2005 USD. Enterprise data refers to the Total
Industry, Market Services, and Construction sector (ISIC Rev.3 10-74). Both statistics
are averaged for the 2004-2009 period. The correlation is 0.64.
Source: OECD Annual National Accounts and SDBS Structural Business Statistics.
Together, these facts suggest that the distribution of labor across firms
is an important source of cross-country productivity differences. One can
make this statement more precise by decomposing the sources of aggregate
productivity into the contribution of average firm productivity and the con-
tribution of labor allocations (employment shares) across firms. The next
section presents the results of this the decomposition exercise.
2.2. How important are employment shares in explaining aggregate produc-
tivity differences?
The Olley and Pakes (1996) measure of aggregate productivity, defined
as the weighted average of firm-level productivity
∑
i θitωit, is decomposed
as
11
Θt ≡
∑
i
θitωit = θ¯t +
∑
i
(θit − θ¯t)(ωit − ω¯t), (1)
where Θt is the weighted productivity index at time t, θi is firm-level
productivity, ωi is the share of economic activity, and a “bar” over a variable
represents the unweighted industry average of the firm-level measure. The
index of productivity is composed of two terms: θ¯, the unweighted produc-
tivity term; and the Olley-Pakes (OP) covariance term
∑
i(θit− θ¯t)(ωit− ω¯t),
which is positive if firms with a higher than average productivity have a
higher than average share of activity. In the analysis, θit is the labor produc-
tivity at the firm level and ωit is the firm’s share of employment. Hence, the
OP covariance is a measure of misallocation of employment across firms.
The employment shares affect the OP covariance term but not the un-
weighted productivity term. Therefore, one can get a sense of the impact
of employment shares on aggregate productivity by exploring how much of
aggregate productivity differences are due to differences in the OP covariance
term. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 2.
The first column of Table 2 reports the weighted labor productivity of
each country, sorted from highest to lowest. The rankings roughly match the
rankings of aggregate labor productivity measured as GDP per hour worked,
with Belgium being the most productive nation and Greece being the least
productive in the sample. The second column reports the OP covariance
term of each country, which is also correlated with GDP-per-hour-worked
rankings. The numbers in these two columns confirm that countries with
the highest aggregate productivity are precisely those that allocate a larger
share of their workforce to the most productive firms. Interestingly, Belgium
also has a low OP covariance term, meaning it owes its high productivity to
firms being very productive despite its most productive firms not having the
highest employment shares.
The last four columns of Table 2 show the results of two counterfac-
tual exercises. The first counterfactual determines how much each country’s
weighted labor productivity would increase if it had Germany’s allocation of
labor across firms (as measured by Germany’s OP covariance term). The
results are most striking for South Europe countries, where large firms have
low shares of employment. If they had Germany’s allocation of employment,
Italy and Spain would be almost as productive as Germany. Greece and Por-
tugal would bridge two-thirds and three-fifths of their productivity gaps with
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Table 2: Olley-Pakes decomposition (2004-2009)
Counterfactuals
Germany’s Greece’s
OP covariance OP covariance
Weighted labor productivity OP Weighted labor % change in Weighted labor % change in
(Germany=100) covariance productivity productivity productivity productivity
Belgium 113 -1.47 121 +7% 98 -14%
Finland 109 2.61 110 +1% 86 -21%
UK 108 2.69 109 +1% 85 -21%
Austria 107 1.72 109 +2% 86 -20%
Sweden 101 2.65 102 +1% 79 -22%
Germany 100 3.19 100 — 77 -23%
Netherlands 96 -0.84 102 +7% 79 -17%
Denmark 94 1.17 98 +4% 74 -21%
Spain 87 -2.41 96 +11% 73 -16%
Italy 82 -6.38 99 +20% 75 -9%
Greece 65 -10.53 88 +36% 65 —
Portugal 55 -3.71 67 +21% 44 -21%
Notes: Olley-Pakes decomposes weighted labor productivity into an unweighted produc-
tivity term and a (OP) covariance term. The counterfactuals maintain each country’s own
unweighted term constant and change the OP covariance term. Germany has the highest
OP covariance in the sample and Greece the lowest OP. Data refers to the Total Industry,
Market Services, and Construction sector (ISIC Rev.3 10-74). Data is calculated each
year and then averaged for the 2004- 2009 period. Firm labor productivity is in USD
Purchasing Power Parity (using OECD conversion rates) and normalized by Germany’s
productivity.
Source: SDBS Structural Business Statistics and author’s calculations
Germany, respectively. In terms of percentage gains, Greece would increase
its labor productivity by 36 percent, Italy and Portugal by 20 percent and
21 percent, respectively, and Spain by 11 percent.
The second counterfactual determines how much each country’s weighted
labor productivity would decrease if it had Greece’s allocation of labor across
firms (as measured by Greece’s OP covariance term). Productivity losses
that would occur from adopting Greece’s allocation are between 9-23 per-
cent. Such productivity losses would make all North Europe countries except
Belgium less productive than actual Spain.16
The findings of this decomposition exercise confirm that improving the
16An alternative experiment, reported in Appendix A, finds how the weighted produc-
tivity index changes as weights change (as opposed to changing all of the OP covariance
term). The results are similar: productivity gains of adopting the best distribution of
employment shares in the sample are as large as 40 percent.
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allocation of labor across firms would go a long way of bridging cross-country
TFP differences, even if the average firm productivity in a country remains
constant. The next section proposes an explanation.
2.3. Bankruptcy Efficiency: World Bank Doing Business Data
This paper proposes that the recovery rate on loans made to bankrupt
borrowers can by itself generate employment distributions that are consistent
with those in the data. Figure 3 shows that more productive nations tend to
have a higher recovery rate.
Figure 3: Bankruptcy Efficiency and Labor Productivity (2004-2009)
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Notes: GDP per hour worked is in real 2005 USD. Recovery rate is cents on the dollar.
Both statistics are averaged for the 2004-2009 period. The correlation is 0.65.
Source: OECD Annual National Accounts and World Bank Doing Business.
The recovery rate is measured annually by the World Bank using a
methodology developed by Djankov et al. (2008). The World Bank con-
tacts bankruptcy lawyers in each country and sends them an identical case
scenario of a company facing insolvency. The scenario is made as specific as
possible, detailing type of company, size, location, and other factors. The
company has a loan agreement with a domestic bank and is forced to default
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on its loan because of insolvency. The company also has assets (real estate
property) valued at the same amount as the amount outstanding under the
loan agreement. The bankruptcy lawyers are asked for their experience on
the fraction of the outstanding loan that can be recovered by the bank. The
recovery rate is the fraction of the loan recovered, in present value terms and
net of legal costs. Lengthy resolution of legal proceedings, high legal costs
and inefficient outcomes of the bankruptcy proceedings – liquidation rather
than reorganization of a viable firm with temporary liquidity problems – all
reduce the recovery rate measurement.
The following section sets up a model in which firm composition is en-
dogenously generated by an exogenous recovery rate.
3. Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of financial intermediaries and
a continuum of households of mass one.
Preferences and Endowments. Households are endowed with initial resources
fˆ , one unit of labor and a production technology. Some households become
entrepreneurs and operate their technology. Entrepreneurs employ capital
and labor, produce a final good, and consume the profits. The remaining
households become workers and rent their labor to entrepreneurs for the
market wage w. Households have linear utility over consumption, u(c) = c.17
Technology. Households are heterogeneous in entrepreneurial productivity
ai, where i ∈ {low, high}, and have a production technology of the form,
yi = aik
αnγ, α, γ ∈ (0, 1), 0 < α + γ < 1, (2)
with capital k and labor n. A fraction ν of households are endowed with
low entrepreneurial productivity a` and a fraction 1 − ν are endowed with
high entrepreneurial productivity ah. The costs of operating the technology
include a fixed cost f . The need for financing arises because entrepreneurs
cannot self-finance the fixed cost of production, f > fˆ .
17Linear utility has the advantage of delivering closed form solutions to the contract.
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Frictions. In the first-best scenario all agents pool their resources. Funding
goes to the high-productivity agents first and any remaining funding goes to
the low-productivity agents, given that they are profitable (i.e. their profits
as entreprenuers are higher than their consumption as workers). Two frictions
make first-best allocations unachievable. First, entrepreneurial productivity
is the private information of the agents. Hence, low-productivity agents have
an incentive to pretend to be high-productivity agents in order to improve
their chances of obtaining funding.
Production occurs at the end of the period and is observable. Therefore,
productivity levels can be inferred by common knowledge of the production
function and observable inputs. First-best allocations could still be achieved
with unbounded punishments for false reports. However, there is a second
friction that limits repayments to a fraction φ of output. Bankruptcy is the
scenario where output is less than the contractual repayment amount. Thus,
in equilibrium, φ will be mapped to the bankruptcy recovery rate.
Financial Intermediaries. Financial intermediaries operate in a perfectly com-
petitive market.18 Agents do not learn their type until after they have entered
into the contract. This assumption avoids an adverse selection problem that
might lead to non-existence of a unique financial intermediary. If households
are heterogenous before they enter the contract, then competition between
lenders might not lead to a pooling Nash equilibrium: a lender might al-
ways be able to offer a better contract for some borrowers (see Prescott and
Townsend, 1984).
Timing. The timing of events, shown in Figure 4, is as follows:
1. Financial intermediaries post contracts. A contract is a 6-tuple {(e`, L`, LF` ),
(eh, Lh, L
F
h )}. For each productivity type i, the contract specifies the
fraction of entrepreneurs who will operate their technology, ei. The rest
(fraction 1− ei) work for a wage. For entrepreneurs who are chosen to
operate their technology, the contract specifies the repayment schedule
for true reports, Li ≡ L(ai|ai), and for false reports, LFi ≡ L(ai|a−i) .
18The assumption of perfect competition between financial intermediaries implies that
intermediaries offer contracts that maximize the expected welfare of their pool of bor-
rowers. Perfect competition could be replaced by an assumption of a few intermediaries
engaging in Bertrand competition in contracts.
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Figure 4: Timing
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2. Households decide whether to enter the contract with the financial
intermediary. Households who do not enter the contract work for a
wage, obtain the market rate of return on their initial endowment,
η = (1 + r)fˆ , and consume w + η at the end of the period.
3. Households learn their type and report it to the financial intermediary.
4. The financial intermediary chooses the households that will operate
their technologies for each type (through a randomization device).
5. Households chosen to operate their technology become entrepreneurs
and are allocated capital ki, labor ni, and fixed cost f . The households
that are not chosen to operate their production technologies supply
labor, earn the market wage rate and consume w.
6. Entrepreneurs produce and all information is revealed. Entrepreneurs
who report truthfully consume yi − Li. Entrepreneurs who make false
reports consume yFi − LFi .
Financial intermediaries maximize households’ expected consumption sub-
ject to incentive compatibility, enforcement, participation, and resource fea-
sibility constraints, as described below.
The Intermediary’s Problem. The revelation principle allows us to focus,
without loss of generality, on allocations in which households report their
17
type truthfully. The objective of the financial intermediary is to choose
allocations (k`, n`, kh, nh) and terms of contract (e`, L`, L
F
` , eh, Lh, L
F
h ), given
prices w and r that solve the following problem.
1. Objective Function: Entrepreneur’s expected consumption is maxi-
mized (before they learn their type),
maxE[c] = νc` + (1− ν)ch, (3)
where ci = ei(yi − Li) + (1 − ei)w. The consumption considered by
the lender is that of those who enter the contract, so it does not in-
clude endowment η. Since intermediaries can achieve any allocation
that households can achieve on their own, and since the intermediary
maximizes household’s expected utility, households are weakly better
off contracting with the intermediary.19
2. Incentive Compatibility:
ei(yi −Li) + (1− ei)w ≥ e−i(yFi −LFi ) + (1− e−i)w, ∀i ∈ {`, h}. (4)
A type i entrepreneur who falsely claims to be type −i will operate
his or her productive technology with probability e−i and be assigned
capital k−i, labor n−i, and fixed cost f . With these inputs, the type i
entrepreneur will produce yFi =
ai
a−i
y−i (derivation in Appendix C).
3. Imperfect Enforcement: Repayments can be collected up to a fraction
φ of revenues.
Li ≤ φyi, ∀i ∈ {`, h} (5)
LFi ≤ φyFi , ∀i ∈ {`, h} (6)
4. Participation Constraint: If a household declines to enter a contract,
he or she gets wage w, and consumes the wage plus his net worth for a
total consumption of w + η. Therefore, the participation constraint is
νc` + (1− ν)ch ≥ w + η. (7)
5. Feasibility:
19The intermediary can match the outside option by setting eh = e` = 0 and returning
the initial endowment to households.
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The financial intermediary faces a known fraction ν of low-productivity
entrepreneurs and a fraction (1−ν) of high-productivity entrepreneurs.
Let κi ≡ rki + wni + f stand for the cost of producing output yi. The
feasibility constraint requires that the resources the financial intermedi-
ary disburses to entrepreneurs (left-hand side) cannot exceed collections
plus initial resources (right-hand side),
νe`κ` + (1− ν)ehκh ≤ νe`L` + (1− ν)ehLh + η. (8)
In a direct mechanism the financial intermediary allocates output, capi-
tal and labor directly to firms. It is helpful to work directly with repayment
amount Li, but this amount can be mapped to interest rates on a loan of
size rki + wni + f . Randomizing over projects is not necessary to separate
types, but it improves welfare as it convexifies the occupational-choice prob-
lem of households. Thus, other contract spaces might be able to separate
types, but doing so would be sub-optimal to a contract space that contains
randomizations e` and eh.
3.1. Partial Equilibrium: Optimal Contract
Allocations. The intermediary allocates the profit-maximizing levels of cap-
ital and labor to each operating enterprise, given prices r and w. This is so
because the objective of the intermediary is equivalent to a social planner
problem, so the intermediary will try to distort as few margins as possible.
Therefore ki = k
∗
i and ni = n
∗
i . The implication of optimal firm size is
that the marginal product of capital and the marginal product of labor are
equated across firms, and hence there is no misallocation of inputs across
existing firms. To simplify notation from here on, yi, ki, and ni stand for
their profit maximizing levels y∗i , k
∗
i and n
∗
i .
Terms of the contract. The following proposition states partial-equilibrium
properties of the contract.
Proposition 1. Suppose wages are low enough that the no-private-information
allocation is not incentive compatible, w < a`
ah
yh − φκ`.
i. Average firm productivity: The ratio of high-productivity to low-
productivity projects funded is given by the expression
eh
e`
=
y` − L` − w
(1− φ) a`
ah
yh − w. (9)
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ii. Quantity: The quantity of high-productivity projects funded is given
by the expression
eh =
η
ν(κ` − L`)
(
(1−φ) a`
ah
yh−w
y`−L`−w
)
+ (1− ν)
(
κh − φyh
) (10)
iii. Furthermore, suppose wages are high enough so that low-productivity
projects are not profitable, w > y` − κ`. Then L` = 0, and the average
firm productivity (9) and the quantity of high-productivity projects (10)
are strictly increasing in the recovery rate φ.
Proof. For i. and ii. see Appendix D. For iii., if L` = 0 then
∂(eh/e`)
∂φ > 0 and
∂eh
∂φ > 0 in (9) and (10), respectively.
Expression (9) is obtained by combining the binding incentive compatibil-
ity constraint for low-productivity agents with maximum punishment for false
reports, LF` = φy
F
` , and replacing y
F
` =
a`
ah
yh. Expression (10) is obtained
by combining expression (9) with the feasibility constraint and maximum
collection from high-productivity projects, Lh = φyh.
20 The assumption of
an upper threshold for wages is simply a formalization of the initial premise
that private information is a constraint on lenders’ funding decisions. If wages
are too high, low-productivity entrepreneurs are better off renting their la-
bor than they are operating their technologies. In that scenario they have
no incentive to misreport their types as they prefer a lower probability of
operating their technologies, and information constraints do not bind.
The first part of Proposition 1 expresses the ratio of high-productivity to
low-productivity projects. If low-productivity projects are unprofitable, then
this ratio decreases as the level of contract enforceability decreases. The intu-
ition is that, as the ability to punish for false reports shrinks, the lender has
to increase the relative probability of acceptance of low-productivity projects
in order to prevent low-types from reporting falsely. Notice this “average
firm productivity” effect goes solely through the incentive compatibility of
low-productivity agents. The second part of Proposition 1 shows the expres-
sion for the total quantity of high-productivity projects. If low-productivity
20Incentive compatibility for high-productivity agents might bind, in which case Lh is
set by the binding incentive compatibility constraint for high-productivity agents. This is
in contrast to Erosa and Hidalgo-Cabrillana (2008); see Appendix D for details.
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projects are unprofitable, the expression increases with the recovery rate.
This effect comes from the feasibility constraint. As the recovery rate in-
creases, the lender is able to extract higher rents from profitable projects
(right-hand side of (8) increases) in order to fund other profitable projects
(left-hand side of (8) increases).
The assumption of unprofitability of low type is a sufficient but not nec-
essary condition to obtain clean predictions for the change in average firm
productivity and total quantity with recovery rates. If low-productivity en-
trepreneurs are profitable, the average productivity and quantity of projects
could still increase, depending on model parameters. However, the quan-
titative exercise in Section 5, which imposes no restrictions on parameters,
verifies that all conditions and assumptions hold.
3.2. Total Factor Productivity
Define pi` ≡ νe` and pih ≡ (1 − ν)eh as the measure of low-productivity
and high-productivity projects operated in the economy, respectively. Let
Y ≡∑i piiyi, K ≡∑i piiki, and N ≡∑i piini be the aggregate ouput, capital
and labor in the economy, respectively. The following proposition states that
TFP is increasing in the recovery rate through the weights of the firm-size
distribution, e` and eh.
Proposition 2. i. The aggregate production function has a closed-form
solution given by
Y = AKαNγ (11)
where TFP is
A ≡
(
νe`a
1
1−α−γ
` + (1− ν)eha
1
1−α−γ
h
)1−α−γ
(12)
Measured TFP in the competitive equilibrium is
Y
K
α
α+γN
γ
α+γ
= Y
α+γ−1
α+γ A
1
α+γ (13)
ii. TFP is strictly increasing in the quantity of high-productivity projects
eh. In addition, if (1−ν)a
1
1−α−γ
h > νa
1
1−α−γ
` , TFP is strictly increasing in
the average quality of projects eh/e`, as long as e`+eh is simultaneously
non-decreasing.
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Proof. For i., see Appendix B. ii. follows from (12).
For a non-decreasing total quantity of projects, as the recovery rate in-
creases, TFP increases if the quantity of low-productivity projects does not
decrease faster than the increase in high-productivity projects. In the quanti-
tative exercise, both high-productivity projects and low-productivity projects
increase with the recovery rate.
A is not the same as measured TFP. In level accounting exercises the
aggregate production function is assumed to display constant returns to scale
with capital share equal to 1/3. Since firms in the model have decreasing
returns to scale, equation (13) is the correct expression to compare to the
data in the quantitative section, with α
α+γ
set to 1/3.
3.3. Competitive Equilibrium
With the household’s and intermediary’s problem specified, the compet-
itive equilibrium in this economy can now be defined. Aggregate labor sup-
ply is determined by the measure of households who did not become en-
trepreneurs, ν(1− e`) + (1− ν)(1− eh). Aggregate labor demand is given by
the total amount of labor demanded by firms, νe`n` + (1− ν)ehnh. Similarly
aggregate capital demand and aggregate final good supply are determined
by νe`k` + (1 − ν)ehkh and νe`y` + (1 − ν)ehyh, respectively. Capital is
supplied by external sources, K. Finally, aggregate final good demanded
is determined by the residual consumption from the household’s problem,
ce = ν[e`(y` − L`) + (1− e`)w] + (1− ν)[eh(yh − Lh) + (1− eh)w].
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium consists of a financial contract {ei, Li, LFi }i,
allocations {yi, ki, ni}i and prices w and r such that
1. Allocations ki, ni and yi maximize firms’ profits, given prices w and r
for all i
2. The financial contract solves the financial intermediary’s problem
3. Markets Clear:
• w clears the labor market: νe`n` + (1− ν)ehnh = ν(1− e`) + (1−
ν)(1− eh)
• Given r, the capital market clears: νe`k` + (1− ν)ehkh = K
• The final goods market clears: E[c] + f(νe` + (1− ν)eh) = νe`y` +
(1− ν)ehyh
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General equilibrium effects reinforce the misallocation of resources at low
levels of bankruptcy efficiency. With better bankruptcy efficiency, there is
higher labor demand which drives up wages and relaxes the incentive compat-
ibility constraint of low-productivity agents by making entrepreneurs’ outside
option more attractive. (Higher wages relax (4) since (1− e`) > (1− eh)).
With the description of the model complete, Section 4 discusses how the
model is taken to the data.
4. Taking the Model to the Data: Multi-Sector Model
An important set of parameters in the calculation of TFP are the levels
of firm productivity, a` and ah. The first-order conditions for the firm prob-
lem show a direct relationship between the employment distribution and the
distribution of productivity. In particular,
nh
n`
=
(
ah
a`
) 1
1−α−γ
(14)
In order to calibrate the distribution of productivities one could arbitrar-
ily divide the U.S. firm-size distribution into a representative large firm and
a representative small firm and use equation (14). Alternatively, one can ex-
tend the model in some direction to obtain a distribution of firm sizes. The
approach I use here is to extend the model to the case of multiple sectors
and show that the main results for a single sector hold in this more general
framework.21
Preferences, production functions, and frictions are the same as in the
one-sector economy. A sector in the model is a group of firms that produce
an identical product. There is a unit mass of agents born into each sector.
Agents are born with a sector-specific technology but they can work in any
sector for a wage w, that is the same across sectors. Sectors differ in the
level of fixed cost that are involved in operating a technology. There is
one intermediary per sector (no cross-subsidization across sectors), so the
21Another approach is to stick to one sector and have a full distribution of productivities.
Although possible in theory, this approach raises a set of unnecessary complications: the
number of possible incentive-compatibility deviations to check increases exponentially with
number of types, which forces the use of tools such as the first-order approach (as in
Rogerson, 1985), for which concave utility is usually a necessary condition.
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contract of the one-sector economy can be viewed as the contract of a specific
sector.
Let subscript j be the sector subscript and i be the productivity level
subscript. To redefine the problem with multiple sectors, rewrite individual
production functions as
yij = aik
α
ijn
γ
ij. (15)
A firm’s problem is
max
kij ,nij
pjyij − rkij − wnij − fj, (16)
where pj are sector-specific output prices. Let pi`j ≡ νe`j and pihj = (1 −
ν)ehj stand for the measure of low and high-productivity projects in sector
j, respectively. Using the aggregation in Appendix B, each sector has a
representative firm with a production function of the form
yj = Ajk
α
j n
γ
j , (17)
where yj =
∑
i piijyij, kj =
∑
i piijkij, nj =
∑
i piijnij, andAj ≡
(∑
i piija
1
1−α−γ
i
)1−α−γ
.
The representative sector firm solves the following problem
max
kj ,nj
pjyj − rkj − wnj. (18)
The fixed cost shows up as a cost in the firm problem but not in the
representative sector firm problem. Finally, I introduce a new parameter,
θ, which determines the complementarities between sectors. In particular,
I assume that a perfectly competitive representative firm produces a single
final good by combining sector outputs with a CES technology, so that it
solves the problem
max
{yj}
(∑
j
yθj
)1/θ
−
∑
j
pjyj, (19)
where 1
1−θ is the elasticity of substitution between sectors.
The main difference from the one-sector competitive equilibrium is that
there are now J new market-clearing conditions, one for each sector.
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Definition 2. A competitive equilibrium with sectors consists of financial
contracts {cij, eij, Lij, LFij}ij, allocations {nij, kij, yij}ij and prices w, r, and
{pj}j such that
1. kij and nij, and yij solve the firm’s problem, ∀i, j;
2. The financial contract solves the financial intermediaries problem, ∀j;
3. Markets Clear:
• pj clears the sector market, ySupplyj (pj, r, w) = yDemandj (pj, {ce})
∀j;
• w clears the labor market, ∑j∑i piinij = ∑j[ν(1 − elj) + (1 −
ν)(1− ehj)];
• Given r, the capital market clears: ∑j∑i piikij = K;
• The final goods market clears, ∑j E[cj] +∑j fj(ν(1− elj) + (1−
ν)ehj) =
(∑
j y
θ
j
)1/θ
where ySupplyj is output by sector j, y
Demand
j is demand by the final good
producer.
Proposition 3. TFP in the multi-sector economy with sectors is analogous
to the single-sector economy. In particular,
Y
K
α
α+γN
γ
α+γ
=
(∑
j
(
y
α+γ−1
α+γ
j A
1
α+γ
j
) θ
1−θ
) 1−θ
θ
(20)
where
Aj ≡
(
νe`ja
1
1−α−γ
` + (1− ν)ehja
1
1−α−γ
h
)1−α−γ
(21)
Proof. See Appendix E.
5. Quantitative Analysis
In this section I calibrate the model to data for the United States. In the
calibration I treat the United States as an economy with private information
and imperfect enforcement frictions, and with a recovery rate of 80 percent.
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With the calibrated economy in place, I vary the recovery rate as in the data
in order to determine how the United States’ productivity would change if it
had other countries’ recovery rates.
5.1. Calibration and Measurement
Several of the model parameters are those of the standard growth model
and I follow standard procedures for choosing those values. Relative to the
growth model, what is new are the parameters that determine the distribu-
tion of firms in equilibrium. Tables 3 and 4 summarize the calibration.
Table 3: Benchmark Calibration to U.S. Data: Parameters Set Before Equilibrium
Symbol Definition Value Target/Source
φ Recovery Rate 80% U.S. recovery rate
α Firm Capital Share 28.3% Agg. Capital Share, Dec. Returns
γ Firm Labor Share 56.7% Agg. Capital Share, Dec. Returns
θ Complementarity between Sectors 0.9 Markup of 11%
J Number of Sectors 36 Rajan and Zingales (1998)
[f1, f36] Range of Fixed Costs [1, 4.3] Rajan and Zingales (1998)
a` Productivity of Low Type 1 Normalization
Table 4: Benchmark Calibration to U.S. data: Parameters Calibrated to Equilibrium
Outcomes
Symbol Definition Value Target Moments U.S. Data Model
r Interest Rate 10% Capital Output Ratio ∼ 3 3.12
ah Productivity of High Type 1.695 Top 10% employment share 65% 65%
ν Fraction of Low Type 63% Skew of firm-size distribution 5.05 4.99
η Initial endowment 0.376 Mean firm size 50.5 50.5
I first discuss the choice of parameters for which direct estimates exist,
followed by those chosen to match equilibrium moments. The data on recov-
ery rate is collected from the World Bank Doing Business database. I use
the average from 2004 (the earliest available data) to 2009 (to exclude the
financial crisis). The recovery rate is φ = 80% for the United States.
The extent of decreasing returns in the production function is an impor-
tant parameter in the analysis. Direct estimates of firm-level production func-
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tions and several calibration procedures point to a value for α + γ = 0.85.22
The split between α and γ is done according to the income share of capital
and labor, so I assign 1/3 to capital and 2/3 to labor, implying α = 0.283
and γ = 0.567.23
Sector outputs are aggregated with a CES function with elasticity param-
eter 1
1−θ . TFP differences are magnified by the degree of complementarity
between sectors, so I am conservative in the choice of this parameter and
choose θ = 0.9. In a model of monopolistic competition this choice would
deliver a markup of 11 percent, a lower bound among the empirical estimates
of markup costs.24
The number of sectors and the sector-specific fixed cost are based on
values provided by Rajan and Zingales (1998). Using Compustat data, Rajan
and Zingales calculate the need for external finance (defined as the fraction
of capital expenditures that is not financed with cash flow from operations)
for thirty-six sectors in the United States. The sector with lowest need for
external finance is Tobacco, with a measure of -0.45 and the one with the
highest need is Drugs at 1.49. I set J = 36 and normalize the lowest level
of sector fixed cost to 1. Sector fixed costs are chosen to range uniformly
from 1 to (0.45 + 1.49)/0.45 = 4.3. To place the magnitude of fixed costs in
perspective, consider that the wage in the competitive equilibrium is around
1.05. Therefore, fixed costs of starting a firm are about 1 to 4.3 times the
average annual salary.
The model period is one year. The interest rate is set to 10% to match
a capital output ratio of 3. This is consistent with evidence in Gomme
and Rupert (2007). I am left with four parameters to match to equilibrium
targets: a`, ah, ν and η. Any choice of a` can be undone by rescaling ah,
so I set a` = 1 as a normalization. The other parameters are calibrated to
moments of the U.S. firm-size distribution.
The data for the U.S. firm-size distribution is from the US Census Bu-
reau, which reports the number of establishments for certain employment
22See, for example, Basu and Fernald (1995), Atkeson and Kehoe (2005), and Amaral
and Quintin (2010).
23Using labor shares, Gollin (2002) shows that capital shares are close to 1/3 for different
countries and do not systematically vary with development levels.
24This value is in line with the choice in Atkeson and Kehoe (2005), and the evidence
in Basu and Fernald (1995), Basu (1996) and Basu and Kimball (1997).
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ranges for all sectors at the three-digit level.25 I restrict the observations to
manufacturing to make it compatible with Rajan and Zingales (1998) fixed-
cost data. I set ah to match the share of employment by the top 10 percent
of the largest firms. I set ν, to match a mean to median firm size ratio of
5.05. The endowment η shifts the firm-size distribution, so it is set to match
the average firm size in U.S. manufacturing of 50.5.26
6. Findings
6.1. Variation in the recovery rate, φ
I begin by describing how employment shares and the firm-size distri-
bution vary with the recovery rate. Large firms in the model are those of
high-productivity in each sector, pihj, which are also the largest firms overall.
Figure 5 plots the employment share of large firms. In the model, the em-
ployment share of large firms is Nhpih/(N`pi`+Nhpih), with pih =
∑
j pihj. The
match of this statistic in the data is the employment share of firms larger
than the average firm size of fifty employees. Figure 5 shows that employ-
ment shares by large firms drops from 83 percent in the benchmark to 64
percent when the recovery rate is at 45 percent, which is Greece’s recovery
rate. Figure 6 plots the proportion of large firms in the economy, pih/(pi`+pih).
The figure shows that the proportion of large firms drops from 13 percent in
the benchmark to 5 percent.27
Figures 7 and 8 describe how the change in emploment shares and firm-
size distribution affect aggregate TFP and labor productivity, respectively.
Figure 7 shows that TFP can drop up to 30.7 percent if recovery rates vary
from 80 cents on the dollar to 45 cents on the dollar. The convexity of the
TFP function, which is inherited from the convexity of the “proportion of
large firms” function, suggests that the explanatory power of recovery rates
25Given that the Lucas span of control framework is a theory of establishments, not
an enterprise-level theory, it is important to use establishment data for the quantitative
exercise. I thank an anonymous referee for this observation. Establishment data is publicly
available for the U.S. but, unfortunately, not for European countries.
26From U.S. Census data I only observe the number of establishment for certain em-
ployment ranges. The mean employment size for each range is used to compute the mean
firm size.
27Notice that Figures 5 and 6 are the model equivalents to Figures 1 and 2 in Section
2.1.
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Figure 5: Employment Share of Large
Firms
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Figure 6: Proportion of Large Firms
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Notes: (Left) The employment share of large firms is calculated as Nhpih/(N`pi` +Nhpih).
(Right) The proportion of large firms is calculated as pih/(pi` + pih).
increases with income; that is, differences in bankruptcy efficiency generate
greater differences in TFP among high-income countries.
Figure 8 plots aggregate labor productivity, which drops by 47.8 percent
when recovery rates go from 80 cents on the dollar to 45 cents on the dollar.
Aggregate labor productivity varies significantly more than aggregate TFP
across countries in the data — a variation the model captures — because la-
bor productivity captures variations not only in TFP but also in capital labor
ratios. Capital labor ratios decrease with the recovery rate because lower re-
covery rates imply lower wages. Since capital rental rates are constant, firms
substitute labor for capital.28
28Appendix F presents an alternative specification where the parameter governing truth-
ful repayments is different from that governing false report repayments and only false
repayment vary with the recovery rate.
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Figure 7: TFP and Recovery Rate
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Notes: Data TFP is calculated from GGDC (1997 levels) and AMECO (growth rates).
Data for Greece is missing on the GGDC.
7. Evidence From Bank Loan Portfolios Across Countries
The European Central Bank compiles data of new bank loans across coun-
tries that help check consistency of the model with data along another di-
mension. A commonly used proxy of the level of financing to small and
medium-sized firms (SMEs, firms with less than 250 employees) in OECD
countries are new loans of EUR 1 million or less.29 Consistent with the
model implications, Figure 9 shows that the proportion of new loans that are
of value less than EUR 1 million is greater for countries with a low recovery
rate.30
29See OECD (2012).
30Of course, based on this graph alone, causality could run both ways. That is, it could
be possible that banks lend proportionally more to small firms in poorer countries precisely
because there are more small firms for reasons other than financing needs. However, it
is reassuring for the theory in this paper that this correlation exists, as there are reasons
30
Figure 8: Labor Productivity and Recovery Rate
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8. Conclusion
This paper documents that the employment share of large firms is an
important driver of productivity differences among OECD countries, and it
proposes differences in bankruptcy efficiency as a driver of these shares. Low
recovery rates, a measure of bankruptcy efficiency, affect productivity by
shifting the selection of firms towards less productive firms and reducing the
number of firms in an economy. The model calibrated to U.S. data suggests
that differences in the recovery rate alone can generate labor productivity
and differences in TFP of similar magnitudes of those observed across OECD
countries.
The model in this paper is deliberately kept simple so as to present, as
transparently as possible, a channel by which bankruptcy policy affects ag-
why it might run in the opposite direction. For example, countries with high recovery
rates also tend to have more liquid bond markets (Becker and Josephson, 2016). As long
as larger firms resort more to bonds in countries with high recovery rates, they might also
depend proportionately less on bank loans.
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Figure 9: Percentage of New Bank Loans Allocated to SMEs
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Notes: The statistic represents the proportion of new loans to non-financial firms of EUR
1M or less, a proxy for loans to SMEs. New loans are loans other than revolving loans,
overdrafts, convenience and extended credit card debt loans to non-financial corporations.
The statistic is calculated for every period and averaged for 2004-2009. ECB data is only
for Eurozone members, so it excludes Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Sweden from
the original sample. The correlation is -0.56.
Source: European Central Bank and World Bank Doing Business.
gregate productivity. In order to do this, the model abstracts from savings
decisions, both by households and firms. It is not clear whether endoge-
nous savings would dampen or amplify the cross-country TFP differences
attributed to bankruptcy policy. Savings would dampen TFP differences
across countries if firms and households can save themselves out of borrow-
ing constraints. However, if households in poor countries are not able to save
enough to overcome borrowing constraints, TFP differences across countries
would be amplified. Exploring the impact of savings on the channel presented
in this paper would be interesting future work.
A related point is that the model attributes all differences in employ-
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ment shares to differences in bankruptcy procedures. However, other poli-
cies might also help explain the prevalence of small firms in poorer coun-
tries. Examples include taxation, onerous regulation, poor transportation
and communication infrastructure, and lack of flexible labor markets. These
alternative sources of distortions might complement or substitute for the role
of bankruptcy in shaping firm-size distributions. Future work could look at
disentangling the effect of the competing sources of firm-size distributions.
Work that helps measure these forces directly in a way that makes them
comparable across countries would be very helpful in understanding their
impact on differences on aggregate productivity and income.
Appendix A. Additional Tables
Table A-1: Correlations by Sector (2004-2009)
Correlation between Correlation between
Employment Share by Large Firms Proportion of Large Firms
and Agg. Productivity and Agg. Productivity
Services (ISIC 50-74) 0.69 0.62
Manufacturing (ISIC 15-37) 0.74 0.68
Food products, beverage and tobacco (ISIC 15-16) 0.44 0.39
Textiles and textile products (ISIC 17-18) 0.51 0.38
Tanning and dressing of leather (ISIC 19) 0.40 0.19
Wood products (ISIC 20) 0.49 0.34
Paper products, printing and publishing (ISIC 21-22) 0.54 0.56
Energy, chemical and plastic products (ISIC 23-25) 0.76 0.53
Other non-metallic mineral products (ISIC 26) 0.74 0.74
Basic metals and metal products (ISIC 27-28) 0.59 0.47
Manuf. of machinery and equipment (ISIC 29) 0.67 0.54
Electrical and optical equipment (ISIC 30-33) 0.38 0.52
Transport equipment (ISIC 34-35) 0.37 0.27
Manufacturing nec, recycling (ISIC 36-37) 0.31 0.61
Notes: Aggregate productivity is GDP per hour worked in 2005 USD constant prices.
Employment data is total employees (engaged). Large firms refers to firms with 250 or
more employees. The correlation is calculated each year for each country in the sample for
the reported industry, and then averaged for the 2004-2009 period and over all countries
in the sample. The countries in the sample are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
Data for industries within manufacturing are only available for the period 2004-2007.
Industry codes are ISIC Rev.3.
Source: OECD Annual National Accounts and SDBS Structural Business Statistics.
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Table A-2: Alternative Decomposition: Changing Weights Only
Counterfactuals
Germany’s weights Greece’s weights
Weighted labor productivity Weighted labor % change in Weighted labor % change in
(Germany=100) productivity productivity productivity productivity
Belgium 113 120 +6% 99 -13%
Finland 109 109 0% 100 -8%
UK 108 107 -1% 100 -8%
Austria 107 110 +3% 95 -11%
Sweden 101 102 +1% 93 -9%
Germany 100 100 — 91 -9%
Netherlands 96 99 +3% 84 -12%
Denmark 94 94 0% 99 +6%
Spain 87 98 +13% 79 -9%
Italy 82 100 +22% 77 -7%
Greece 65 91 +40% 65 —
Portugal 55 69 +24% 49 -11%
Notes: This table reports an alternative decomposition to the one reported in Table
2. The counterfactuals maintain each country’s own firm productivities (θs in equation
1) and replace each country’s employments shares (the ωs) for Germany’s and Greece’s
employment shares, respectively. Data includes Total Industry, Market Services, and
Construction (ISIC Rev.3 10-74). Data is calculated each year and then averaged for the
2004- 2009 period.
Source: SDBS Structural Business Statistics and author’s calculations
Appendix B. Aggregate Total Factor Productivity and Firm Pro-
ductivity
Individual i is endowed with production function yi, which takes inputs
ki and ni combines them with a Cobb-Douglas technology
yi(ki, ni) = aik
α
i n
γ
i (B.1)
where α + γ < 1. The first order conditions from the firm’s problem are
α
yi
ki
= r, (B.2)
γ
yi
ni
= w. (B.3)
The ratio between marginal products is
ni
ki
=
rγ
wα
. (B.4)
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Obtain expressions for unconditional factor demand by substituting (B.4)
back into the first order conditions (B.2) and (B.3),
ki(r, w) = B
1
1−α−γ
α
r
a
1
1−α−γ
i , (B.5)
ni(r, w) = B
1
1−α−γ
γ
w
a
1
1−α−γ
i . (B.6)
Where B =
((
α
r
)α ( γ
w
)γ)
. Define K =
∑
i kipii, N =
∑
i nipii and Y =∑
i yipii, where pii is the fraction of projects of type i that are operated.
Aggregate equations (B.5) and (B.6) and divide both sides by
∑
i piia
1
1−α−γ
i
to obtain
K ·
(∑
i
piia
1
1−α−γ
i
)−1
= B
1
1−α−γ
α
r
, (B.7)
N ·
(∑
i
piia
1
1−α−γ
i
)−1
= B
1
1−α−γ
γ
w
. (B.8)
Substitute back into (B.5) and (B.6),
ki(K) = K
a
1
1−α−γ
i∑
i piia
1
1−α−γ
i
, (B.9)
ni(N) = N
a
1
1−α−γ
i∑
i piia
1
1−α−γ
i
. (B.10)
Plugging back into the individual production function (B.1) yields
yi = a
1
1−α−γ
i
(∑
i
piia
1
1−α−γ
i
)−α−γ
KαNγ. (B.11)
Aggregating one last time we find the expression for sector output,
Y = AKαNγ (B.12)
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where
A ≡
(∑
i
piia
1
1−α−γ
i
)1−α−γ
.
Appendix C. Ouput of False Report
Substitute the marginal ratios (B.4) into the production function (B.1)
and solve for conditional factor demand
yi(w, r, ki) = aiB
( r
α
)α+γ
kα+γi (C.1)
yi(w, r, ni) = aiB
(
w
γ
)α+γ
nα+γi (C.2)
with B as defined in Appendix B. Solving for factors, we get conditional
factor demand,
ki(w, r, yi) =
α
r
B−
1
α+γ a
− 1
α+γ
i y
1
α+γ
i (C.3)
ni(w, r, yi) =
γ
w
B−
1
α+γ a
− 1
α+γ
i y
1
α+γ
i (C.4)
Substituting into the cost function, κi(w, r, yi) = rki(w, r, yi)+wni(w, r, yi)+
f and substituting in for B,
κi(w, r, yi) = (α + γ)
((α
r
)α ( γ
w
)γ)− 1α+γ
a
− 1
α+γ
i y
1
α+γ
i + f (C.5)
Find output by plugging the cost function into the firm problem and
maximize to get
yi(w, r) =
((α
r
)α ( γ
w
)γ) 11−α−γ
a
1
1−α−γ
i (C.6)
We can rewrite the cost function as
κi(w, r, yi) = ψiy
1
α+γ
i + f
where ψi ≡ a−
1
α+γ
i (α + γ)
((
r
α
)α (w
γ
)γ) 1α+γ
.
36
An entrepreneur who misrepresents his type is given funds ψ−iy
1
α+γ
−i + f
but his real production costs are ψi(y
F
i )
1
α+γ + f . Making these two equal
yields yFi =
ai
a−i
y−i.
Appendix D. Solution to the Contract
The solution begins with the no-private-information problem, and then
adds private information.
Rewrite the problem as a linear programming problem, with L˜i ≡ eiLi
max
e`,eh,L˜`,L˜h,L˜
F
` ,L˜
F
h
E[c] = ν(e`(y` − w)− L˜`) + (1− ν)(eh(yh − w)− L˜h) + w(D.1)
s.t. e`(y` − w)− L˜` ≥ eh(yF` − w)− L˜F` (D.2)
eh(yh − w)− L˜h ≥ e`(yFh − w)− L˜Fh (D.3)
νe`(κ`) + (1− ν)eh(κh) ≤ νL˜` + (1− ν)L˜h + η (D.4)
0 ≤ L˜i ≤ eiφyi ∀i (D.5)
0 ≤ L˜Fi ≤ eiφyFi ∀i (D.6)
0 ≤ ei ≤ 1 ∀i (D.7)
No Private Information. In the no-private-information environment, (D.2)
and (D.3) are absent. Notice the effect of L˜` and L˜h is neutral: Increasing
either reduces (D.1) by the same amount it relaxes (D.4) so their values
are indeterminate. The proportion of high ability projects funded is the
maximum possible since it increases (D.1) by more than it reduces (D.4)
because yh − κh − w > 0. The amount of funded projects eh ≥ e` because
yh−κh−w > y`−κ`−w. The proportion of low projects funded is e` = 0 if
low type is unprofitable because it constraints (D.4) by more than it increases
(D.1) y` − κ` − w < 0, and positive otherwise.
Private information. If w > a`
ah
yh(1 − φ) then the no-private-information
allocations are incentive compatible.
Recall the incentive compatibility constraint for low type,
e`(y` − L`) + (1− e`)w ≥ eh(yF` − LF` ) + (1− eh)w. (D.8)
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If low ability agent is unprofitable (y`−κ` < w) or there are sufficient high-
ability agents (eh < 1), then e` = 0 in the no-private-information allocation.
This allocation is incentive compatible if
w ≥ eh(yF` − LF` ) + (1− eh)w. (D.9)
A low-productivity entrepreneur who lies obtains output yF` =
a`
ah
yh (Ap-
pendix C). To deter lying, it is optimal to set the punishment for lying as
high as possible, LF` = φy
F
` = φ
a`
ah
yh.
Substitute this expression in (D.9) to obtain,
w ≥ eh a`
ah
yh(1− φ) + (1− eh)w. (D.10)
Substract (1−eh)w and divide by eh from both sides to obtain the thresh-
old wage beyond which the no-private-information allocation is always incen-
tive compatible.
w ≥ a`
ah
yh(1− φ). (D.11)
Incentive compatibility binds: w < a`
ah
yh(1− φ)
First, setting L˜Fi = eiφy
F
i for all i is optimal since it relaxes (D.2) and
(D.3) but has not other effects elsewhere.
Next, (D.2) binds and, rearranging, we obtain
eh
e`
=
y` − L` − w
(1− φ) a`
ah
yh − w. (D.12)
Feasibility always binds, so combining (D.12) with (D.4) one obtains
eh =
η
ν(κ` − L`)
(
(1−φ) a`
ah
yh−w
y`−L`−w
)
+ (1− ν)
(
κh − Lh
) (D.13)
and the amount of low-ability projects funded,
e` =
η
ν(κ` − L`) + (1− ν)
(
κh − Lh
)(
y`−L`−w
(1−φ) a`
ah
yh−w
) . (D.14)
The remaining arguments of the contract are Lh and L`. We already
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argued that the direct effect of L˜h in the objective function and feasibility
constraint is neutral. Yet, increasing Lh has another indirect effect on the
objective function by increasing the quantity of projects eh and e`. To see
this, notice that ∂eh
∂Lh
> 0 and ∂e`
∂Lh
> 0 in expressions (D.13) and (D.14).
Since ∂c
e
∂e`
> 0 and ∂c
e
∂eh
> 0 in (D.1), Lh = φyh, unless (D.3) binds and then
Lh is pinned down by (D.3) with equality.
L˜` is also directly neutral on the objective function and the feasibility
constraint. Its indirect effect on the objective function through e` is pos-
itive, as ∂e`
∂L`
> 0. However, its indirect effect through eh depends on the
profitability of low-productivity projects. If low-type projects are profitable
(y` − κ` > w) then ∂eh∂L` > 0 because ∂∂L`
κ`−L`
y`−w−L` < 0 in the denominator of
expression (D.13). Hence increasing L` has an overall positive effect on the
objective function, and L` = φy`. However, if low types are unprofitable,
then ∂eh
∂L`
< 0 by the opposite argument. Since high-productivity projects
are more beneficial to the objective function than low productivity projects
(∂c
e
∂e`
< ∂c
e
∂eh
), then the negative effect of increasing L` dominates and L` is
driven to its lowest value, L` = 0.
Appendix E. Modified Model with Multiple Sectors
Recall the production function for the representative firm in sector j,
yj = Ajk
α
j n
γ
j
Take first order conditions of sector’s j problem
pjα
yj
kj
= r
pjγ
yj
nj
= w
Substitute back in the production function to get
pj = y
1−α−γ
α+γ
j A
−1
α+γ
j
(( r
α
)α(w
γ
)γ) 1α+γ
(E.1)
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Aggregate the first order conditions to get
rK = α
∑
j
pjyj (E.2)
wN = γ
∑
j
pjyj (E.3)
By the assumption of zero profits for the final good producer, Y =∑
j pjyj. Substitute in (E.2) and (E.3),
rK = αY (E.4)
wN = γY (E.5)
These expressions allow us to solve for prices and parameters in equation
(E.1), (( r
α
)α(w
γ
)γ) 1α+γ
= Y (KαNγ)−
1
α+γ (E.6)
Now take first order conditions from the final good producer problem (19)
and aggregate to get (∑
j
p
− θ
1−θ
j
)− 1−θ
θ
= 1 (E.7)
Combining (E.1), (E.6) and (E.7) we get expression (20).
Appendix F. Alternative setup
In the model, the imperfect enforcement parameter affects repayments for
both truthful and false reports. Suppose instead that the repayment limit
from truthful and false reports are governed by different parameters, φT and
φF . Bankruptcy efficiency can now be mapped to φF without affecting φT .
This specification has the advantage that the average quality of firms and
the quantity of firms produce sharper results: the average quality of firms
decreases with the recovery rate even when low productivity projects are
profitable. The disadvantage of this specification lies in the credibility of
the quantitative experiment, as φT is now a free parameter. Suppose that
φT = φF = 0.8 for the US. Keeping φT at 80 percent and varying only
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φF as in the recovery rate data still produces significant drops in TFP and
labor productivity, though smaller than in the main experiment. When the
recovery rate goes from 80 to 45 cents on the dollar, TFP now drops by 17.6
percent (as opposed to 30.7 percent), and labor productivity drops by 30.6
percent (as opposed to 47.8 percent).
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